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Abstract: Adorno and Levinas argue from distinct yet intersecting perspectives
that there are pathological forms of freedom, formed by systems of power and
economic exchange, which legitimate the neglect, exploitation and domination
of others. In this paper, I examine how the works of Adorno and Levinas assist
in diagnosing the aporias of liberty in contemporary capitalist societies by
providing critical models and strategies for confronting present discourses and
systems of freedom that perpetuate unfreedom such as those ideologically
expressed in possessive individualist and libertarian conceptions of freedom.
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Introduction
The human subject is bewitched by the idea of its own freedom as if by a magic
spell. (Adorno 2006: 220)
Freedom is typically taken in the popular Western imagination – even if only
rhetorically and ideologically – to be the original source (as freedom of the
will to formulate, choose and determine its actions) and ultimate value (as the
liberty to pursue one’s own will and interests as one sees fit) for action. Neg-
ative liberty, defined as independence from an arbitrary external will and
authority if not necessarily the condition of law established through consensus,
is the defining feature of classical liberalism and contemporary capitalist-ori-
ented libertarianism. Yet, already in Locke, liberty as free consent is contrasted
with while remaining bound to coercion. Locke’s conception of liberty vali-
dates, to varying degrees, war, slavery, colonialism and the appropriation of
others’ collective common property – such as the land of the Native Americans
– in order to make it usefully and individually one’s own.1
It is apparent in Locke’s political writings how the theodicy of the liberal
Englishman’s individual freedom legitimates the exploitation of those inca-
pable of realising such liberty. Likewise, the greater amount of wealth pro-
duced by capitalist inequality justifies its unequal distribution according to
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the agent’s individual initiative in Adam Smith and orthodox interpretations
of capitalism. Nineteenth-century American individualists including Emerson
and Thoreau celebrated the self-initiated responsibility and generosity of the
individual, and presented solitude as a condition of a deeper sociability and
solidarity. Nonetheless, the popular authoritarian libertarianism of contempo-
rary politics does not recognise this free generosity of noble souls, or acknowl-
edge community as a desired consequence of liberty, but rather locates the
primary virtues of liberty in the fear and distrust of others and the politics of
mass resentment.2
The current condition of North American political life, which I will adopt
as a concrete example, indicates how ‘freedom’ – despite its critical potential
and utopian promise for individuals and communities – can be problematic in
validating what should otherwise not be justified. Freedom can become, as
David Harvey has described, ‘a freedom to dominate and exploit others’ (Har-
vey 2000: 173). Insofar as capitalist freedom justifies ‘a politics of unequal
rewards’, not only vast inequalities of wealth but more active forms of
exploitation and marginalisation, it is questionable whether freedom and lib-
erty are the unconditional goods they are construed to be when they are
deployed in an ideological and mythical manner that is pathological and
destructive to the flourishing of individual and common life. This pathology
of freedom, with its dialectic of self-assertion – against those who are differ-
ent, weaker, poor, foreign, ‘the enemy’ who is not with us – and authoritarian
submission – to those whose image is ‘like us’, ‘the friend’ who is with us – is
an all too apparent tendency in American media, politics and social life even
as there are tendencies that challenge it.
I will address the philosophical issue of the value of freedom in this essay
with an eye towards this contemporary situation. There is a propensity in mod-
ern Western philosophy to demand and reify the absolute freedom of the ego
and glorify the possessive individual, conceptualized through individual spon-
taneity and striving for self-preservation. A series of thinkers in the twentieth-
century have questioned this priority of the self, and the identity demanded by
its logic, for the sake of the other person and that which remains non-identical
(Schroeder 1996: 101). Frantz Fanon described how ‘some want to impose
their presence on the world, fill it up with their presence’, a ‘some’ that
includes groups as well as individuals who want to absorb and exclude others
according to their own standard of freedom. This is the freedom of the self
that sets itself against others in order to assert and stabilise its own sense of
self. Fanon noted that ‘one German philosopher described the process as the
pathology of freedom’ (Fanon 2008: 200).
Fanon is referring to Günther Anders, who – in a neglected yet trenchant
and prescient essay – detailed the corrosive and pathological characteristics of
self-assertive freedom. The nihilistic freedom that neglects and negates the
other is a condition of National Socialist totalitarianism according to Anders,
demonstrating how an ideology of freedom – the notion of a unique ‘German
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freedom’ in this case – is complicit with practices of domination. Instead of
being the contrary of freedom, as libertarian theory maintains, freedom is
intertwined with domination as the will to fill the world with oneself and make
it conform to one’s own identity (Anders 1936/37: 22–54; 2009: 278–310).
Negative liberty, the defining characteristic of a particular variety of liberalism
from Locke to contemporary libertarianism, functions in this context not only
as a rationalisation for indifference and irresponsibility towards others, but as
a validation for active injustice. As a social ideology, if not necessary as philo-
sophical theorising, it opens the space for the realisation of one’s freedom
over others who do not deserve to partake in it, because of God, fate or the
market that invisibly and ineluctably determine all merit and value.
To evaluate critically contemporary capitalist societies, an inflationary
understanding of ‘liberalism’ needs to be challenged. ‘Liberalism’ should
not be understood in such a broad sense that classical liberalism and repub-
licanism, capitalist-oriented libertarianism and varieties of contemporary lib-
eralism compatible with more robust forms of social responsibility cannot
be distinguished. This paper, in light of ethical and social-political argumen-
tation unfolded in the works of Levinas and Adorno, is concerned with the
variety of liberalism defined by the priority of negative liberty and possessive
individualism.
The Critique of Freedom
In the ideological assertion of freedom, with its anti-intellectualist ressenti-
ment, freedom appears as the opposite of critique and as the negation of the
need to answer to the other. Identifying the habitual and unthought with nature,
critique is suspected of being the destruction of natural liberty in restraining
routine unreflective action by potentially placing it into question and calling
the self to offer an account of itself. Adorno and Levinas are both acutely
aware in their own ways of how rational freedom betrays itself. Even the osten-
sive critical freedom of self-reflection and the give and take of reasons in com-
munication, praised by more socially oriented and progressive thinkers of
autonomy from Kant and Mill to Dewey and Habermas, can become an imped-
iment to rather than the fulfilment of freedom as consent becomes the coercion
to assent.
The problematic of self-negating freedom, noted by Hegel and Marx, was
intensified in the critical social theory of the Frankfurt School. Theodor
Adorno and Max Horkheimer traced the aporias and collusions of autonomy
and heteronomy and spontaneity and instrumentality in Western modernity,
diagnosing society’s constructed image of freedom as the ideological destruc-
tion of the autonomy promised by the Enlightenment. The ideology of indi-
vidualism, in which individuals are mass-produced copies of what the
individual is projected to be, corresponded with the concrete individual being
66 Eric S. Nelson
undermined and absorbed by manipulated things and images in the pseudo-
individualistic conformity of the culture-industry and mass-consumerism:
The total effect of the culture industry is one of anti-enlightenment, in which, as
Horkheimer and I [Adorno] have noted, enlightenment, that is the progressive dom-
ination of nature, becomes mass deception and is turned into a means for fettering
consciousness. It impedes the development of autonomous, independent individuals
who judge and decide consciously for themselves. These, however, would be the
precondition of a democratic society which needs adults who have come to age in
order to sustain itself and develop. (Adorno 1991: 92; cf. 54–5)3
Kantian autonomy and the Enlightenment’s promise of rational independence
is reductively narrowed to ‘free self-interested choices’ between predeter-
mined brands and prefabricated activities, mature individuation is blocked and
frustrated, and free spontaneous activity is reduced to a repressive entertain-
ment and relaxation, a reactive realm of escape and irresponsibility rather than
the flourishing and fulfilment of life.4
Adorno in particular has shown how a purportedly democratic popular cul-
ture, which advertises every new technological and cultural fad as liberation,
can be dialectically a vehicle for its opposite. For Adorno, ‘the ideology of
freedom and autonomy’ camouflages an ‘actual state of unfreedom and depen-
dence’ (Cook 1996: 64). The culture industry, ‘the most inflexible style of
all’, is the ‘most effective form of ideology today’, since it is no longer depen-
dent on any particular ideology or perspective but appropriates and transverses
them all (Adorno and Horkheimer 2004: 104; Adorno 2006: 78).
Adorno’s analysis of how popular culture and its appearance of freedom
were constituted by the culture industry, commodity fetishism and con-
sumerism has been criticised as undemocratic elitism. Yet questioning mass-
produced culture and its illusion of freedom is an interrogation of self-negating
democracy and self-undermining freedom. Adorno’s analysis does not entail
a denial of the emancipatory potential of the Enlightenment and modernity, as
critics of Adorno such as Habermas charge, but the diagnosis of its ideological
uses and deformations (Bronner 2004: 5).
It might also be argued that even if Adorno’s criticism of consumerist indi-
vidualism is accurate, it does not follow that the liberal capitalist account of free
market liberty is wrong, since it only entails that such liberty has not yet been
effectively achieved. This argument reflects the dialectical ambiguity of freedom
as future promise and negated present. The critique of liberal freedom need not
necessarily be the denial of freedom, as the libertarian objection suggests. Critics
of existing conditions of unfreedom in advanced capitalist societies can distin-
guish between freedom’s role in the structural inequalities of society, its ideo-
logical falsification that excuses these inequalities of class, gender, and race and
its interruptive and transformative promise in relation to the present.
Adorno’s analysis developed Marx’s thesis of the heteronomy of individual
in face of the autonomy of the commodity in commodity fetishism (Hammer
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2006: 29–31). Still one cannot be reduced to the other to the extent that the
promise of freedom and the fact of domination are dialectically mediated with-
out thereby being identical (Habermas 1992: 28). It is, according to Adorno,
the logic of war and totality to posit only one or the other, for and against, and
friend and enemy (Adorno 1974: 131–2). It is the incompleteness of ideolog-
ical mediation, in identity and social totality, and the prospect and promise of
its interruption that are articulated by Adorno and also – in a non-dialectical
language – Emmanuel Levinas.5
Questionable Liberty
According to Peter Dews, the question ‘why human beings prefer an inade-
quate, self-destructive freedom to genuine freedom’ raises difficult issues of
human motivation and the prospect of evil (Dews 2008: 130). The conformist
and destructive tendencies of individualistic and democratic freedom have
been at issue from Plato’s diagnosis of the feverish conditions of the Athenian
polis to Hegel’s dialectic of the self-destruction of the French Revolution to
de Tocqueville’s portrayal of the tyranny of the majority and conformity that
characterises the political life of the United States (Marcuse 1970: 96; Harold
2009: xxvi–xxviii).
Liberty can be betrayed in the name of liberty, and authentic freedom can
be ideologically distorted and masked by inauthentic and pathological free-
dom. Yet perhaps freedom is much more questionable than the distinctions
between authentic and inauthentic, negative and positive, freedoms suggests.
Perhaps prioritising freedom is not as innocent and natural as it appears, but
intrinsically questionable as a betrayal of the other person. In Levinas’s works
in particular, one finds a radical questioning of the freedom of the ‘I’ in its
naïve and irresponsible spontaneity insofar as this is oblivion to the other
(Levinas 1996a: 17). Freedom as a sense of heightening power and increasing
enjoyment without concern or obligation towards others, asserting its place in
the sun unconcerned with any other (except to evade the other’s shadow), is
arbitrary and tyrannical (Levinas 1999a: 15, 23; Bloechl 2000: 33).
Levinas connects this feeling of power with the conatus and struggle for
existence that he, in parallel to Adorno’s analysis of the socio-pathological
sublimation of self-preservation, identifies as central to modern philosophy’s
preoccupation with the self, its compulsive self-concern, and its perseverance
in being. At the same time, insofar as this historically formed egoism is tied
up with a calculative self-interest that is defined by social conventions, this
form of self and subjectivity is a product of the ritualised logic of sacrifice.
Despite its numerous suspicions of morality, justice and altruism, this sacrifi-
cially constituted self is conformist, moralistic and vindictive to those who do
not follow the rules of the game with its sacrifices and privileges. Adorno and
Horkheimer uncover in the Dialectic of Enlightenment and in their studies on
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the authoritarian personality how strategies of adaptive self-preserving reason
become maladaptive, irrational and authoritarian through their redeployment
in unequal systems of exchange structured by power. In this configuration of
exchange and sacrifice, the individual’s pursuit of the good life and the ‘nat-
ural goods’ prized by classical capitalist liberalism – life, liberty and happiness
– systematically reproduce damaged life.
While the freedom of the subject is typically prioritised and valorised in
modern Western philosophy, Levinas concludes that responsibility necessarily
precedes and is the condition of any freedom: ‘To be obliged to responsibility
overflowing freedom, that is, responsibility for the others ... The pure passivity
that precedes freedom is responsibility’ (Levinas 1987: 136).6 This passivity
is not the docile weakness of egos administered by the culture industry, locked
into their private infantile patterns of consumption, and lacking the integrity,
maturity and strength to resist their subordination to the social totality,
depicted by Adorno. Levinas’s passivity is not a departure and safe-haven
from the social but entanglement in the life, needs and suffering of others.
Passivity signifies the one-for-the-other of responsibility that is the necessary
if not sufficient condition for social-political equality. My dependence on the
other – to the point of being a substitute for and prisoner to the other – is the
very facticity of freedom; the fact that freedom is without excuse and must
answer for itself before others. It ‘must justify itself’ in response to the other
person (Chanter 2001: 270). Genuine – that is, social other-oriented – freedom
is impossible without the on-going critique to which it must answer. This cri-
tique is not initiated by itself and its autonomy in the Kantian fashion but by
its potential irresponsibility and injustice to the other person.
Anti-cognitivist interpretations of Levinas deny that he engages in argu-
mentation or critique, as these concern discursive truth and validity claims.
Levinas questioned the concept of critique, in its Kantian and general sense,
and so there is supposedly no critique in Levinas. Nonetheless, Levinas fre-
quently engages in practices of critical reading and reflection: the interrogation
of institutions, practices and reasons (Harold 2009: xvi, 191). Levinas not only
engages in reading as ‘cloture’, as Simon Critchley claimed, but reading as
questioning as he disputes, reverses and transverses the claims of the philoso-
phers (Critchley 1999: 145). Levinas engages in questioning and critique in
the sense of responding otherwise. One concept that is critically shown by
Levinas not to mean what it is usually assumed to mean is that of freedom.
Without the strategies of critical social theory, Levinas exposed in his own
way the ideological function of freedom understood as egoistic indifference
towards others or as a playful spontaneity in undermining responsibility. Lev-
inas criticises philosophers such as Eugen Fink and Jeanne Delhomme who
‘demand an unconditional freedom without responsibility, a freedom of play’
(Levinas 1996a: 90; 1996b: 53).7 Levinas’s inclusion of the non-cognitive then
is not an exclusion of argumentation and reasoning from the ethical, even 
as reflection and conceptualisation are derivative to the encounter with and
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exposure to the other. All knowing, all discourse, already presupposes the
encounter of self and other even if it is suppressed, distorted and bracketed.
But the encounter does not end communication and reflection; it is their tran-
sient point of departure.
Levinas’s rethinking of freedom places freedom in risk while not being
able to abandon or eliminate it either: ‘One is not against freedom if one seeks
for it a justification’ (Levinas 1990a: 302). But, as Levinas points out against
Heidegger and Sartre’s portrayal of freedom as the spontaneity of the self,
‘freedom is not justified by freedom’ (Levinas 1990a: 303; cf. Kleinberg 2005:
275). Although responsibility is anarchic, it goes beyond the self’s intentions
and calculations and involves a displacement in which there can be an
encounter between self and other, such that one can only speak of a ‘difficult
freedom’ confronted not by mere resistance and limitation but by the legiti-
mate and inescapable claims of the other. Consequently, for Levinas, an unlim-
ited or unconditional freedom that does not acknowledge or respond to the
other’s address, suffering and illness – as in the denial of healthcare – is not
freedom but neglect and tyranny.
Some interpreters deemphasise the radicalism of Levinas’s argumentation.
Rudi Visker, for example, claims: ‘Instead of limiting my freedom – as is the
case in pathology – Levinas’ trauma establishes it, or “invests” it’; yet this
investment is the limitation of the freedom of play ‘without responsibility’
(Visker 2004: 89; cf. Nancy 1993: 189). Such attempts to make Levinas sound
less challenging to standard notions of freedom – that he is only limiting its
playfulness not limiting my freedom per se or questioning the priority of free-
dom – de-radicalise Levinas’s claim to the weak thesis that freedom has
sources outside of itself but that these external origins should not change how
we should conceive of freedom. This is explicitly not the case for Levinas,
however, ‘[i]t is for the free self to fix the limits of this responsibility … [b]ut
it can do so only in the name of that original responsibility …’ (Levinas 1990a:
225). Freedom is not self-initiating and then either morally or pathologically
limited; freedom is already configured through the tension of an ethical
response to others and complicity with their betrayal. Levinas’s freedom is
accordingly not only an initial traumatism that is integrated and superseded; it
is insomnia, wakefulness and vigilance (Levinas 1998b: 70; 1999b: 65).
Such readings do not adequately articulate the pathological freedom that is
a crucial concern for Levinas and for those who interpret contemporary polit-
ical appeals to freedom as involving an ethical promise while being acutely
ideological and pathologically caught up in domination, exploitation, neglect
and violence. Levinas does not abandon the word freedom, yet he does radi-
cally question its self-presentation since freedom is often the legitimation for
avoidance, excuse and violence. Levinas thus asks how free persons ‘can be
subject to reason without losing their freedom’ and how we can ‘give meaning
to this notion of finite freedom without striking a blow against freedom in its
finitude […] how can freedom be, while also being limited?’ (Levinas 1999b:
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96; 2000: 178). This prospect of a responsible freedom proceeding from and
in response to the other suggests an alternative to the aporetic dynamic of
moralising and irresponsibility that characterises ideological discourses of
individualism and liberty.
Asymmetrical Freedom
Another problematic interpretative strategy suggests that Levinas is too willing
to abandon freedom and its privileges. In his account of Levinas based on his
interpretation of the Frankfurt school, C. Fred Alford misses an important
dimension of Levinas’s thought when he contends that: ‘Against freedom of
the will in all its guises, Levinas posits freedom of the abandonment of the
will, an openness to the world’ (Alford 2002: 121). Levinas overtly and repeat-
edly rejects Heidegger’s openness, letting and releasement (Gelassenheit).
Levinas does not argue for an altruistic and receptive openness without will,
but rather for a dependence and passivity that is active responsibility to the
other and the other’s freedom.8 Although Adorno rejects overusing the lan-
guage of passivity and receptivity as the abandonment of critical thought, asso-
ciating this language with Heidegger, it should be noted that for Levinas it is
the point of departure for discourse and the concept that arrive ‘after the fact’
yet which still do arrive and mediate the relations between self and other. Con-
sequently the immediacy of the ethical is always caught up in the complicity
of the political.
I would argue that Levinas is not advocating the abandonment of the will
nor a complete giving over (Hingabe) and subservience of the self, with its
potential reactionary political consequences feared by critics who identify his
thought with their interpretation of Heidegger’s failings. Levinas shows how
the will is already informed by responsibility from the beginning and without
evasion: ‘To reflection, this responsibility is astonishing in every way, extend-
ing all the way to the obligation to answer for the freedom of the other, all the
way to being a responsibility for his responsibility’ (Levinas 1998b: 70). Free-
dom as responsibility for the freedom of the other confounds the philosophy
of the primacy of the self, as it entails that my freedom is implicated in the
fate and freedom of others, and I cannot deny them on behalf of my freedom.
It is a false alternative to conclude that either Levinas negates freedom by
responsibility to the other or he must leave the priority of the freedom of the
subject intact and unaltered. The configuration of freedom is rethought
through asymmetry, and the asymmetrical freedom between self and other.9 I
do not choose my or the other’s freedom, instead I am constituted through
others. My ‘responsibilities cannot be freely chosen’, as there is an asymmetry
between freedom and responsibility, other and self, which contests the Kantian
model of reciprocal autonomy and the mutual deduction of autonomy and
responsibility in the ‘fact of reason’. (Ziarek 2001: 89). More than this, I am
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more responsible and less free than the other due to the passivity constitutive
of the ethical: ‘Pure passivity preceding freedom is responsibility. But the
responsibility that owes nothing to my freedom is my responsibility for the
freedom of others’ (Levinas 2003: 55).
Passivity means that I am not free to pick and choose in relation to the
other; I respond and must respond infinitely much to the chagrin and discom-
fort of self-interested calculation and egoism: ‘It implies responsibility –
which should surprise, nothing being more opposed to freedom than the non-
freedom of responsibility. It is the coincidence of freedom and responsibility
that constitutes the I, doubled and encumbered with itself’ (Levinas 1990a:
271). Does such a strategy make freedom superfluous to ethical responsibility?
(Bergo 2003: 120). Does this movement from the other subordinate the indi-
vidual too radically to the ethical or the religious? Hent de Vries notes that:
‘What is at stake here, however, is an asymmetrical freedom in which God in
the very donation of His presence retains the initiative at every single moment’
(1999: 60). Levinas often voices this priority of the ethical above all else with
reference to God, as when he claims: ‘It is a responsibility that precedes free-
dom, which would mean precisely belonging to God, a unique belonging
which, anterior to freedom, does not destroy’ (Levinas 1994a: 107; 1999b:
58). Yet this is religion determined by the ethical. It is always the other that
places the ethical demand upon me: ‘Suffering the weight of the other man,
the “me” [moi] is called to uniqueness by responsibility’.10
If there are authors who find asymmetrical ethics too burdensome and
demanding in calling us to our non-indifference and responsibility for others,
other detractors contend that asymmetrical freedom is inherently conservative
and elitist in negatively privileging myself over others as if injustice were
solely up to me (Zafirovski 2009: 321). Slavoj Žižek, to take one example,
asks whether this ‘self-questioning’ is not – through the kind of reversal of
position interrogated by Hegel and Nietzsche in their depiction of the dialectic
between master and slave – in fact ‘self-privileging’: ‘does this asymmetry
not effectively end up in privileging one particular group that assumes respon-
sibility for all others [and] embodies in a privileged way this responsibility
[…?]’ (Žižek et al. 2006: 155). Are not such fears of asymmetry warranted
insofar as neoconservative ideologues (1) demand an aggressively interven-
tionist international politics based precisely on the asymmetrical responsibility
and exceptionalism of the United States, and (2) criticise ethical symmetry
and its associated liberal freedoms for the sake of an authoritarian paternalistic
tradition that they supposedly undermine (Kalb 2008).
Concerns about the political consequences of asymmetry are intensified in
the case of Levinas as his ethical-political scepticism has been interpreted as
part of postmodern and communitarian critiques of liberal Western modernity.
Levinas is often seen as rejecting liberalism and modern Western political
thought rather than rethinking its sources (Batnitzky 2006; Harold 2009).
 Levinas’s critique of liberalism, however, is not only based in pre-modern
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 traditional Jewish and Greek sources. It should be understood in the modern
context of his overt reliance on and appeals to the French republican tradition
as he deploys in his political argumentation the progressive universalising
republican language of the ‘rights of man’, and liberty, equality, ‘fraternity’
(Caygill 2002: 7–9, 151–8). It is a genuine issue, forcefully raised by Simon
Critchley, whether the classical republican language of the ‘rights of man’ and
‘fraternity’ is inherently masculine or whether it can be reinterpreted as
‘human rights’ and ‘solidarity’ (Critchley 2007: 94).
Levinas is an inheritor of the radical republicanism of Rousseau and the
French Revolution insofar as solidarity, which is the asymmetrical ethical con-
dition of the liberty of each individual, has priority over the liberty that can
neglect or deny the other’s suffering. It is this ethical claim on the political
through the intervention of the third party, and the third-person perspective
abstracted from the asymmetry of the I–thou encounter, which calls for the
institutionalisation of justice, equality and liberties that also threatens their
ethical sources. Processes of institutionalisation are a necessary infidelity to
the primacy of the ethical that would keep institutions and their impersonal
logic in check. In this context, as Adorno also warns of the liquidation of the
individual for the sake of the impersonally administered socialist or capitalist
collective, Levinas both agrees and disagrees with the Marxist prioritisation
of the collective social and political sources for obtaining individual liberties
for all (Harvey 2000: 173). These structures must be equally for the sake of all
(as political) and asymmetrically for the other individual (as ethical).
Levinas’s use of the republican – and at time the socialist – political tradi-
tion is simultaneously its critique insofar as these political registers – whether
liberal, republican or socialist – can become the means to subordinate rather
than recognise the other. The ‘ideology of freedom and equality’ in its modern
technological and consumerist context, is the foundational ideology for liber-
alism and conservatism, capitalism and socialism (Stivers 2008: 29). The
underlying philosophical ideology of freedom remains deeply questionable
(Nancy 1993: 46). This ideology – with its political consequences of indiffer-
ence and oblivion towards others – needs to be confronted and freedom itself
reconsidered to the extent that autonomy functions to isolate the subject and
deny relatedness (Reiss 2002; Rothenberg 2009: 201).
Although the affirmation of relatedness in difference and responsibility in
alterity entails risking acting in place of the other rather than only for her or
him, it is the asymmetrical difference of responsibility itself that does not
allow the self to replace the other. My responsibility is always conditioned by
being towards the other. This involves an externalisation and expropriation of
the self that disrupts responsibility being understood as privileged mastery
over others and challenges absorbing and controlling the other in the name of
being responsible for the other. Asymmetry entails an irrevocable difference
between self and other that paternalistic responsibility wants to remove for the
sake of an identity that hierarchically identifies and ranks individuals, groups
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and peoples. There is then a radical difference between anarchic difference-
preserving and hierarchical difference-integrating asymmetries such that they
cannot be assumed to be the same.
Moreover, since Levinas’s interpretation of asymmetrical responsibility
both exaggerates and limits responsibility, it problematises ossified asymmet-
rical hierarchies, reductive symmetrical conformism and the avant-gardist eso-
teric assumption of power that purports to act in the best interests of equality.
The denial of asymmetry and difference risks becoming totalitarian indiffer-
ence and depersonalisation, where there are some who enjoy power while oth-
ers are pressed to conform or are eliminated under the guise of equality. This
betrayal occurred, for instance, in what Levinas described as ‘the supreme
paradox in which the defense of the person is inverted into Stalinism’ (Levinas
1998a: 191). This remark illustrates Levinas’s appreciation and criticism of
the history of socialism insofar as its political instrumentalisation and institu-
tionalisation undermined its ethical motivation.
Just as there is a pathological equality, there is a pathology of freedom in
the indifference and irresponsibility towards the other of libertarian freedom,
where some enjoy the leisure of their freedom while others – who are ‘not
my concern’, as I am not my brother’s keeper as Cain said of Abel – experi-
ence toil, suffering and injustice. In reply to such a denial of answerability,
Levinas remarks:
It is as if, behind being, one could hear the sarcastic laughter of irresponsibility, for
which the freedom within being is not free enough; but beyond being there would
extend the goodness of unbounded responsibility, for which that freedom is not
generous enough. (Levinas 1996b: 54)
Responsibility, as irrevocably asymmetrically greater for me than for anyone
else, is inevitably a heteronomy and subordination to the other for the leisurely
freedom for which responsibility is always too much: ‘One thus reproaches
one’s freedom for losing itself in the burden of responsibility for oneself and
others; and concern for others can, of course, appear as a form of subjection,
as an infinite subjection’ (Levinas 2001: 192). This subordination is justice,
and there is no ethical subject without such subjection. Ethical individuation
occurs through dependency, relatedness and substitution rather than through
self-creation. There is, however, not only subordination but the anarchy of the
good – irreducible to calculation and rules – prior to and constituting freedom
(Levinas 1981: 138).
The Pathology of Freedom and the Idolatry of Liberty
Nietzsche’s Zarathustra warned of the new idol of the state, requiring idolatry
and human sacrifice from good and bad alike, such that the human individual
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begins only where the state ends (Nietzsche 1980: vol. 4, 61–4). Nietzsche
like de Tocqueville describes the conformity of social relations beyond the
state. Precisely in the valorisation of the individual, the individual is lost
through the media and instruments that are supposed to preserve and support
it. There is also, as Adorno repeatedly diagnosed in his analysis of the Ameri-
can culture industry, a cult and idolatry of individualism – at times more dan-
gerous than that of the state, because more effective through accepted
conformity – that is the destruction of actual individuals.
The fixated typology of what it means to be an individual reifies individual
life and does not allow individuals to be different than mass-produced indi-
viduals. These forms are not only externally imposed, and thus more easily
remedied, but structure the pre-reflective and non-conceptual dimensions of
individual life where the ethical takes place for Levinas (Adorno 1991: 105).
Although Adorno likewise brings into play the non-cognitive and mimetic as
a challenge to identity-thinking, anti-cognitivism based on the pre-reflective
without critique and argumentation reproduces without any prospect of chal-
lenging damaged life. The natural and the transcendent are not unambiguous,
they are already stylised and restyled through society, history and culture even
if they are irreducible to them.
Freedom as a natural capacity or transcendent referent is already ideologi-
cal. As ideological, freedom can function to compel and integrate without
interruptive or transformative promise or prospect. Günther Anders conse-
quently diagnosed how autonomy and authenticity can be the compulsion of
power demanding surrender before those interests that put individuals in their
place, negating their freedom in the name and fantasy of their freedom
(Anders 2009: 307–8).
Adorno notes how in antiquity and modernity negative liberty, the separa-
tion of freedom from freedom in society, undermines the freedom to actively
participate in social life:
The situation in which the individual was vanishing was at the same time one of
unbridled individualism, where ‘all was possible…’.
Freedom from society robs the individual of the strength for freedom. (Adorno
1974: 149–50)
That is, asocial freedom limited to a reified and absolutised private self is not
the ‘natural negative freedom’ envisioned in libertarianism but a denial of the
freedom that participates in and helps shape society (Adorno 2006: 266).
Unlike the responsibility of non-identical sociality, the absolutisation of the
separated and unconditional self and its ‘theodicy of the individual’ impose
conformity by excluding non-identity (Adorno 2006: 57, 60). The privatised
and reified freedom of the self is correlated with its unfreedom in the social
totality. In Levinas’s language, the freedom of the self is the imperialism of
the same (Levinas 1990a: 85–7). Far from being unconditional, such freedom
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is suspect as socially mediated illusion and as ethical irresponsibility. It
denotes not only avoidance but ‘the determination of the other by the same’,
instead of the openness of the same to the other, and is in need of a reversal in
which it learns its responsibility to others (Hofmeyr 2009: 19).
The abstract and ideologically configured individual of fetishised and mass-
produced ‘individualism’ betrays and negates actual concrete individuals, as
negative liberty becomes lack of autonomy in society and the self is reduced
to conformity and consumption: ‘the official culture’s pretence of individual-
ism which necessarily increases in proportion to the liquidation of the individ-
ual’ (Adorno 1991: 35). Adorno concludes on these grounds – not unlike de
Tocqueville a century earlier – that American individualism and libertarianism
are in fact deeply conformist in their simultaneous demand for ‘pragmatic’
adjustment and accommodation to the existing order that provides the standard
for what should be considered popular, successful and useful.
The libertarian ideology of absolute freedom not only masks power and
violence, cynically assuming that persons have equal opportunities yet make
unequal effort to realise their aspirations, it actively restricts actual difficult
liberties – which are conditional, fragile and plural – to the extent that its free-
dom is only the freedom to accept social compulsion (Rose 1996: 60; Adorno
2006: 197). The narcissistic liberty of the self becomes the harshest legalism
applied to others, as genuine difference is reduced to the identity of exchange
in the name of the abstract individual (Adorno 1973: 146).
The bourgeois individual is constructed from its socially trained instincts
to dream of realising itself, its feeling of power, and uniqueness in economic
exchange and yet is used, exhausted and replaced as an identical product in an
indifferent systematic process greater than it. As already intimated in Adam
Smith’s invisible hand and Hegel’s cunning of reason, the idea of asocial free-
dom motivates social individuals who reproduce a fateful whole. The ‘indi-
vidual’ is the mass-produced instantiation of a category, concealed in an aura
of false uniqueness that has been cheaply designed to appeal to each person’s
desire to feel special. But this individual is pathologically conformist, afraid
of people, ideas and cultures that are perceived as other, and easily manipu-
lated by the advertising and ‘spin’ that create and regulate its desires. The
heroic virile individual, a product of the culture industry and the system of
exchange that it expresses, proves to be impotent in regard to the forces that
constitute it and dictate what kind of individual it should be. As freedom
dialectically undermines itself, and as my own idea of freedom claims to
defend while actually betraying the freedom of others, extreme vigilance is
needed to confront our equivocal freedom that is both an ideological fabrica-
tion, designed to compensate individuals for their actual lack of freedom, and
an immanent emancipatory promise (Adorno 2006: 198).
Levinas, akin to Anders and Adorno in this respect, is concerned with the
aporia and self-betrayal of freedom as well as its prophetic promise (Levinas
1998a: 60; Chalier 2002: 75–7). Even as freedom can be a denial of responsi-
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bility and justice, freedom presupposes the society that threatens to destroy it
(Levinas 1990c: 241; cf. Ajzenstat 2001: 51). It is not merely that responsibil-
ity is intimate and personal and mass society undermines such responsibility
(Alford 2002: 124). While recognising the material conditions and needs that
constitute a vulnerable and fragile subject, it is only through responsibility
and ethical love that freedom is invested, elected and individuated as unique
(Levinas 2001: 192–3). Levinas’s thinking of responsibility must risk and
challenge the dangers of the transformation of asymmetrical responsibility
into the empty ethical piety and wretched moralistic posturing in the name of
humanity of which Adorno consistently warns with an ethical intent. Adorno’s
criticisms of morality and the language of ‘minima moralia’ that he turns
against bourgeois and other conventional moralities that reify the ethical life
of individuals is itself ethically motivated (cf. Bernstein 2001: 143).
Levinas’s responsibility is not that of an isolated subject heroically assum-
ing all the burdens of the world, since this conditional self is inevitably social
and oriented towards others in the community of neighbours and in face of the
stranger. The ethical basis of the political should not lead to the moralistic
exclusion of the political for the sake of the ethical. Levinas’s vision of respon-
sible freedom is interlinked with his understanding of classical republicanism
(Caygill 2002: 7–9, 151–8). In particular, freedom is only one dimension of
the classical French republican triad, which Levinas reinterprets rather than
abandons, and is bound up with – the heteronomous conditions of ethical
autonomy – equality and solidarity: ‘One’s duty regarding the other who
makes appeal to one’s responsibility is an investing of one’s own freedom. In
responsibility, which is, as such, irrecusable and non-transferable, I am insti-
tuted as non-interchangeable’ (Levinas 1994b: 125; 1994a: 104).
Responsibility, elected and invested freedom, is more than autonomy or the
free limitation of freedom that comes and goes as it wishes (Levinas 1999a:
148). Describing the transition of the Jewish people from slavery to a condi-
tion of receiving the moral law, Levinas reverses the standard version of the
Nietzschean narrative of slave-morality:
The negative freedom of those set free is about to transform itself into the freedom
of the Law, engraved in stone, into a freedom of responsibilities. Is one already
responsible when one chooses responsibility? (Levinas 1990b: 37).
In contrast with such a difficult responsible freedom that does not deny the
poor and the weak but responds to their distress, Levinas describes how in the
freedom to exploit others, economically and otherwise, the law comes to
repress the freedom it ought to make possible. There is no freedom without
the moral law even as the institutionalisation of law can institutionalise free-
dom in ways that produce injustice and suffering. However, in the unlimited
freedom of desire that knows no laws or boundaries in relation to others, and
in distinction from the anarchic desire for the other in transcendence, love
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without law becomes pleasure without love (Levinas 1990c: 284–5; Peperzak
1995: 190). Others become for the freedom and pleasure of the ego – in its
authoritarian imperialism and pragmatic instrumentalism – impediments to be
removed and objects of calculation to be controlled. Yet within this nexus of
instrumental power relations rests the possibility of encounter and, in the con-
tingent exposure and risky exteriority of the encounter, the reversal of the self
that is the opening towards the other.
A Rousseauian Conclusion
In The Government of Poland, Rousseau cautioned against appeals to liberty
that in reality reaffirm servitude, noting the importance of citizens mutually
digesting and cultivating freedom in contrast with its rhetorical abuses.
Rousseau concluded that: ‘Liberty is a food that is good to taste but hard to
digest: it sets well only on a good strong stomach’ (Rousseau 1985: 29). Lib-
erty requires digestion, the hardship and ‘difficult freedom’ of living and
working not only for oneself but for others.
Levinas and Adorno are not of course ‘against liberty’ as such. Their think-
ing is informed by, respectively, progressive Rousseauian republican and
Marxist social democratic sources that they critically rethought and appeals to
the anarchic promise of freedom that disrupts the indifferent functioning and
autopoietic reproduction of the present social totality. Totality is neither inter-
rupted by the egotistical self striving for more in the name of its freedom nor
by what Adorno and Horkheimer describe as ‘the wretched moralistic attempts
to propagate humanity as the most rational of means’ (2004: 91). While the
latter leaves the systematic sources of injustice uncontested and intact, the
former is an expression of the relentless reproduction of the structural
processes of exchange. This acquisitive ego, despite its intentions and wishes
to ‘simply be itself’, reflects and intensifies the social totality that both Adorno
and Levinas recognise as structured by the identity of exchange. The promise
of freedom cannot then come from me, the sovereignty of the subject, but
must interrupt my freedom and its illusory power from beyond it. It
approaches from the abject and the other to whom it is systematically denied,
disturbing the ego-oriented self and alarming those who ideologically identify
their present advantages with natural liberty.
Despite their own complicities with instrumental reason and identity think-
ing, Levinas and Adorno’s writings suggest critical models and indicate strate-
gies for diagnosing and confronting the structurally formed pathologies
associated with reified visions and the manipulative misuses of liberty. The
problem with freedom is that it is a privilege of the few. Despite its undeniable
accomplishments and promise and potential for letting individuals pursue their
own course and flourish, insofar as this course is pre-empted by conformity,
irresponsibility and indifference to others’ well-being, and the negation of what
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is different in the construction of and resentment against the alien, the foreign
and the enemy, the modern reified conception of liberty is conjoined with the
actual lack of liberty in its enactment, institutionalisation and practice.
Possessive individualism, libertarianism and liberalism in its classical
Lockean and capitalist senses are not the neutral theoretical positions in accord
with ‘nature’ or ‘natural law’ that their proponents interpret them to be. They
are socially formed positions even as the occupants of these roles deny their
own sociality and entanglement with the others who they ignore and disavow.
This is by no means a novel claim but its importance calls for its repetition:
the doctrine of natural liberty serves to mask and justify socially contrived
injustice. These ideological positions can be accordingly – as they are lived
and practiced and not merely thought – the symptom and mask, if not the poi-
son itself, of a social condition appropriately described as the pathology of
freedom and idolatry of liberty. This is fitting to the extent that there is a will-
ingness if not eagerness to engage in the sacrifice of actual concrete individu-
als and their ability to participate in society and have a degree of well-being
without persistent fear of financial and personal ruin.
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Notes
1.    For extended discussions of these issues in Locke, see Tully (1993: ch. 5), Arneil (1996),
Bernasconi and Mann (2005: 94–5).
2.    Although this paper supports the conclusion that there are deeper connections between
self-assertion and negation of the other, we should bear in the mind the differences between
elite theoretically oriented libertarianism and its popular ‘vulgar’ incarnations. There is
also at least a theoretical distinction between libertarian theory, ‘which is racism-free by
construction’, and ‘racism camouflaged behind libertarian rhetoric’, as discussed in J. E.
Roemer et al. (2007: 77).
3.    On the dialectical ambivalence of nature, which serves as both an ideological and critical
concept in Adorno, see Nelson (2011: 105–26; 2012a: 319–41; 2012b).
4.    Cf. Marcuse (1971: 224), Bowie (1997: 289), Scoglio (1998: 17), Eagan (2006: 292).
5.    On the controversy over popular culture, see Wheatland (2009: 132–4).
6.    On the dialectical image that indicates both its ideological character and its potential dis-
ruption, see Adorno (2006: 171). On the ethical beyond the ideological, see Levinas (1998b:
3–14).
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7.    See, respectively, Bernasconi (2005: 170–84) and Hearfield (2004: 24).
8.    Cf. Batnitzky (2006: 20) and Beals (2007: 74).
9.    On the status of critique in Levinas and Derrida, in a reading that risks assimilating Lev-
inas’s ethics to Derrida’s deconstruction, see Bernasconi (2007).
10.    On the problematic character of anti-cognitivist and anti-normative interpretations of Lev-
inas, see Perpich (2008: 89–90, 126).
11.    Cf. Harold (2009: 23–4).
12.    On this passage, note Chanter (2001: 270) and Dudiak (2001: 158).
13.    Levinas distinguishes passivity from receptiveness in Levinas (1998: 89); he contrasts
openness and letting with invocation and summoning in ‘Is Ontology Fundamental?’
(1996a: 5–6); on responsibility for the other’s freedom, and heteronomy as the condition of
autonomy, see Levinas (1994a: 104; 1999b: 58).
14.    For a classic statement of the problem of asymmetrical freedom, see Wolf (1980: 151–66).
For a more general consideration of asymmetrical ethics in Levinas, see Nelson (2010:
454–66).
15.    Levinas (2000: 176); on the religious as a modality of the ethical, see Nelson (2008: 91–
109 and 2009: 177–207).
16.    Adorno (2006: 212). On de Tocqueville, Adorno and America, see the important work by
Offe (2005).
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